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CURING THE BOP PLAGUE WITH BOOKER:
ADDRESSING INADEQUATE MEDICAL
TREATMENT IN THE BUREAU OF PRISONS
NATALIE HINTON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The most unstable inmates are housed in "Fantasy Island," the
nickname for the acute-care unit [in Oklahoma] .... There is a fourpoint restraint table where uncontrollable inmates can be tied down
until they're calm.

Many [inmates] mill... around a recreation area in the zombie-like
gait of the heavily medicated. Others, visibly agitated, pace ...
back and forth and stare ... through the glass.
Those considered too unpredictable and uncontrollable ever to be
free are locked behind thick doors with small windows. Screams,
moans and chanting are normal .... One inmate believes he is in a
prisoner of war camp in Vietnam while another screams that
communists are taking over the facility. He believes two of the
officers on the unit are Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro.

[O]ne resident of the acute-care unit sculpt[s] figurines out of his
feces. Another feign[s] a catatonic episode and nearly bit[es] off the
tip of an officer's nose.'
Our prisons constitute the nation's largest mental institutions
and hospitals, housing nearly three times as many individuals as
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2004, University of Missouri-Columbia. Thank you to Helen and Mary for
opening my eyes to current issues that plague our justice system and for the
invaluable knowledge I gained from working with you. Thank you also to my
parents and Alex for their continuous encouragement and help, and to Eric for
his never-ending support and patience over the past three years. I am forever
grateful.
1. Gary Fields, No Way Out: Trapped by Rules, The Mentally Ill Languish
in Prison,WALL ST. J., May 3, 2006, at Al.
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in actual psychiatric hospitals.' Much to the prisoners' dismay,
once they have been convicted and sentenced to a bleak future of
imprisonment, the unfortunate trend of society is to toss these
individuals aside as "criminals." Society has little, if any, concern
for the health of these "mere prisoners."3 What society does not
realize, or rather chooses to ignore, are the vicious cycles and
overwhelming problems this collective outlook causes. Eventually,
most prisoners will return to their respective communities.
Therefore, why not provide inmates with needed treatment in
prison to ensure a successful future after their release and to
combat the likelihood of recidivism, unemployment, and further
medical problems?
Part II of this Comment will lay out the path leading to
United States v. Booker,4 a case capable of solving this crisis. Part
III will detail the inadequacy of the Federal Bureau of Prisons'
("BOP") current medical treatment programs. Part IV will discuss
how courts consistently choose to ignore the physical and mental
conditions of individuals during the sentencing process. Finally,
Part V will bring to light new policies that must be embraced in
order to better provide adequate medical treatment to all
defendants.
II. THE ROAD TO BOOKER
Now, in the wake of Booker, one cannot begin to persuade
judges to exercise their sentencing discretion without first
understanding the history of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
("Guidelines"), the crucial decisions leading up to Booker, and the
Booker decision itself. Only after this historical roadmap has been
laid can one begin to comprehend the harsh truth in the postBooker world of federal sentencing and its relation to the BOP
problem plaguing our prisons today.

2. Barbara Bergman, The Mental Health Crisis, THE CHAMPION, June
2006, at 4; see JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, COMM'N ON
SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AM'S PRISONS, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 38 (2006)
(reporting that 300,000 to 400,000 inmates suffer from a severe mental illness,
which is "three times the population of state mental hospitals nationwide").
3. See NAT'L COAL. FOR THE MENTALLY ILL IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS.,
JAIL DIVERSIONS FOR THE MENTALLY ILL 1 (Henry J. Steadman, ed. 1990)
(discussing the lack of societal concern for the health of inmates). "[Dietainees
tend to be seen as receiving their just desserts, which do not include quality
health or mental health services." Id.
4. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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A. The Sentencing Reform Act: Establishing
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
The U.S. Sentencing Commission was established under the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.' This Act created a Commission
composed of seven voting members and one non-voting member
appointed by the President of the United States and subject to the
suggestions and approval of the Senate.' Congress empowered the
Sentencing Commission to devise specific sentencing guidelines
and policy statements for every federal offense.7
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act, perceived disparities
existed among sentences primarily because judges lacked
statutory guidance on how to exercise their discretion when
determining a sentence.' As a result, the Sentencing Commission
crafted the Guidelines, which set forth prescribed categories to
assist in determining the proper sentencing range for a

5. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 211-39, 98 Stat. 1987, 1987-2040 (codified as 28
U.S.C. § 991-998 (2000)). The Sentencing Reform Act was signed into law on
October 12, 1984 as Chapter II of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984. Id. § 201-39, 98 Stat. 1976, 1976-2040 (1984).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 991(a). The Sentencing Commission was created as an
"independent" body under the Judicial Branch. Id. The Sentencing Reform
Act further limits the membership provisions of the Sentencing Commission
by stipulating that up to three of the members may be federal judges and up to
four of the total members may be from the same political faction. Id.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (2000). These Guidelines were, and still remain, a
principal part of the Act's sentencing system. Some of the matters to be
determined by the Sentencing Commission included: (1) whether the sentence
should involve a fine, probation, or a term of imprisonment; (2) how much of a
fine should be imposed; (3) how long a term of probation or imprisonment
should be; (4) whether the defendant should be placed on supervised release
after his or her term of imprisonment had concluded; and (5) whether
numerous prison sentences for one defendant should proceed consecutively,
one after the other, or be allowed to overlap. Id.
8. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365-66 (1989)
(acknowledging the lack of guidance for judges in deciding what type of
punishment to impose and the length of that sentence). The need for the
Sentencing Commission was increasingly clear due to the wide ranges of
sentences that were being imposed in cases involving similar crimes and
circumstances. Id. at 366. "[TIhe indeterminate-sentencing system had two
'unjustifi[ed]' and 'shameful' consequences. The first was the great variation
among sentences imposed by different judges upon similarly situated
offenders. The second was the uncertainty as to the time the offender would
spend in prison." Id.
Under the Sentencing Reform Act, the Sentencing Commission was to
carry out its duty in devising Sentencing Guidelines in order to: "(A) assure
the meeting of the purposes of sentencing ... ; (B) provide certainty and
fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted
sentencing disparities ... ; [and] (C) reflect, to the extent practicable,
advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal
justice process." 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1).
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defendant.9 Most importantly, the Commission devised a chart for
calculating appropriate sentencing ranges based primarily on two
main factors: (1) the defendant's criminal history and (2) the type
of offense committed."0 Notably, the statute created a presumption
in favor of a sentence within the Guideline range, dramatically
altering judicial sentencing discretion."
One of the earliest decisions to solidify the constitutionality of
the Guidelines was Mistretta v. United States. 12 In Mistretta, the
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the Guidelines and

9. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 374; see also infra note 10 (providing several
examples of categories used in calculating a defendant's criminal history
category and the offense level).
10. Id. This grid consists of forty-three offense levels and six criminal
history categories ("I" to "VI") for calculating each defendant's sentence range.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL [hereinafter "GUIDELINES MANUAL"]

ch. 5, pt. A (2006). The Guidelines Manual also provides various offense
characteristics and adjustments that may be applied in each case. Id. at ch. 3.
A defendant's offense level may be increased or decreased by the specified
amount of points based on the type of victim involved in the offense, the
defendant's role in the offense, whether the defendant obstructed the
administration of justice, and/or whether the defendant accepted
responsibility for his actions. Id. For example, the offense level may be
decreased if the defendant played a minor role in carrying out the crime, or if
he or she accepted responsibility for his or her actions. Id. §§ 3B1.2, 3E1.1.
On the other hand, if the offense involved a victim who was a government
officer, if the defendant was an "organizer" or "leader" in carrying out the
crime, or if the defendant used a child in committing the crime, the offender's
offense level may be increased by the stipulated number of levels provided
under those provisions. Id. §§ 3A1.2; 3B1.1; 3B1.4.
Once the offense level has been determined (and appropriate adjustments
have been made according to chapter three of the Guidelines Manual), the
judge applies the final offense level and the defendant's Criminal History
category to the Sentencing Table in order to determine the guideline range
sentence. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A. However, at sentencing, a judge was allowed to
depart from the Guideline range if it was warranted. For example, if the
government filed a motion asserting that the defendant had significantly aided
authorities in another case, the judge could issue a sentence below the
Guideline range. Id. § 5K1.1. When a judge chose to depart from the
Guidelines based on aggravating or mitigating circumstances that were not
considered by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines, he or
she was required to give "specific reasons for departure in open court at the
time of sentencing and ...state those reasons with specificity in the written
judgment and commitment order." Id. § 5K2.0(e); see also GUIDELINES
MANUAL infra note 29 (illustrating the application of the Guidelines to
calculate a sentence range).
11. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000) ("The court shall impose a sentence of
").
the kind, and within the range ....
12. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). The defendant, John M. Mistretta, was
indicted for selling cocaine. Id. at 370. Mistretta pled guilty and was
sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment and three years of supervised
release. Id. at 370-71. The Supreme Court granted certiorari due to the
"'imperative public importance' of the issues" involved in Mistretta's case, and
the disparities in sentences among the federal district courts. Id. at 371.

2007]

Curing the BOP Plague with Booker

their creation under the Sentencing Reform Act. 3 However, the
Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the Sentencing
Reform Act and the Guidelines on two grounds. 4 First, the Court
determined that the legislature's creation of the Sentencing
Commission was not an excessive use of congressional power. 5
Second, the Court held that the Sentencing Commission could
carry out its duties without overstepping its judicial boundaries;
that is, without creating a separation of powers issue."6 The Court
declared that the Guidelines were intended to be mandatory,
meaning they were "binding on the courts." 7 Furthermore, 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b) proclaimed that "the court shall impose a
sentence of the kind, and within the range" prescribed by the
Guidelines. 1
The next milestone on the road to Booker involved a narrow
issue decided in Apprendi v. New Jersey.9 The Court questioned
whether a judge's enhancement of a sentence above the statutory
maximum could be based on his own findings - findings that had
not been proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."0
13. Id. at 362, 370-71. While the district court rejected Mistretta's
constitutional challenge, the Court expressed its doubt as to the
constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines. Id. at 370.
Mistretta argued that Congress provided the Sentencing Commission too
much legislative authority. Id. By entrusting the Sentencing Commission
with the task of creating sentencing guidelines for each major crime, Mistretta
argued that the separation of powers doctrine had been violated. Id. at 371.
14. Id. at 412.
15. See id. (ruling Congress did not delegate excessive legislative power).
16. Id. The Supreme Court in Mistretta further reasoned that the
Sentencing Commission, being a body under the judicial branch, was the most
appropriate body to "creat[e] policy on a matter uniquely within the ken of the
judges" since district court judges had the "accumulated wisdom and
experience" directly related to the issues involved in sentencing. Id.
17. See id. at 367-68 (providing that the Guidelines are "determinate" and
that judges must lay out in full their basis for any departure from the
Guidelines); see also GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 10, at 5 (discussing
sentencing departures).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (emphasis added). While this provision clearly
had a predominantly mandatory tone, it also granted judges limited authority
to impose a sentence outside the guideline range if they found an aggravating
or mitigating factor that was not already accounted for in the Guidelines
Manual. Id. This statutory provision played a vital role in the Booker decision
and was ultimately ruled invalid. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (holding that 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), making the Guidelines mandatory, was unconstitutional
because it was inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment).
19. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
20. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468, 471. In this case, Charles C. Apprendi, Jr.
pleaded guilty to firing several shots into an African-American family's
residence after they moved into a predominantly white neighborhood. Id. at
469-70. Police reported that Apprendi made the remark that "because they
are black in color he does not want them in the neighborhood." Id. at 469. At
the hearing, the judge rejected Apprendi's argument that he was not acting
out of racial bias when he committed the crime and that his statements to the
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The Court reaffirmed the long-standing notion that judges
may exercise their discretion when sentencing within the
Guidelines, or within the statutory limits."' However, the Court
also reiterated its prior holding in Jones v. United States2 that
"any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt., 2 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court reversed the sentence because the district judge's
determinations were not proven beyond a reasonable doubt and,
therefore, deprived Apprendi of his Sixth Amendment right to a
jury.24
The Supreme Court continued to stress the Sixth Amendment
protections afforded criminal defendants, as evidenced in Blakely
v. Washington."
The Court's focus was not on "whether
determinate sentencing is constitutional, [but] only about how it
can be implemented in a way that respects the Sixth
Amendment."26 In applying the rule from Apprendi, the Court
held the trial judge overstepped his authority in sentencing the
defendant to a term of imprisonment thirty-seven months longer
than the statutory maximum. Again, the Court stated that the
judge used determinations at sentencing that were not submitted
to a jury or proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 Ultimately, the
police officers were incorrectly portrayed. Id. at 471. The judge himself found
that Apprendi's actions were "motivated by racial bias" and enhanced his
sentence to twelve years, which was above and beyond the statutory maximum
for the count to which he pleaded guilty. Id.
21. Id. at 481.
22. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
23. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. This rule invalidated the New Jersey
practice where a defendant could be found guilty of an offense by the jury but
subsequently punished for a more serious crime based on the judge's own
determinations, imposing a much higher sentence without submitting his
further findings to the jury and proving them beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 491.
24. Id. at 497. Essentially, the holding in Apprendi prevented a judge from
sentencing a defendant to more than the statutory maximum, unless the jury
found beyond a reasonable doubt that a certain sentence-enhancing fact
existed. Id. at 491, 494, 497. Therefore, a judge could not find that
sentencing-enhancing fact on his own determination. This "bright-line rule"
was recently reaffirmed in Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 868
(2007). In Cunningham, the Court held that California's sentencing law
violated the Sixth Amendment because it allowed judges the "sole authority to
find facts" in elevating a sentence. Id. at 870.
25. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
26. Id. at 308. In this case, Blakely's guilty plea contained facts that he
kidnapped his wife, which subjected him to a sentence of not more than fiftythree months under the statute. Id. at 298. The judge then sentenced him to
ninety months, based on the judge's own finding that Blakely acted with
"deliberate cruelty;" an allowed departure under a Washington statute. Id. at
298, 300.
27. See id. at 301, 304 ("[wlhen a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's
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Court reversed the trial court's sentence because it was based on a
disputed fact that had not been presented to a jury."8 At this
point, with Booker just over the horizon, Apprendi and Mistretta
still reigned supreme. Both decisions rendered the Guidelines
mandatory and required that judges submit facts that enhance a
defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum to the jury.
B. The Bare Bones of Booker
Prior to Booker, the Guidelines were strictly imposed as
mandatory prescribed sentences, transforming each sentence into
a mathematical equation.29 In Booker, the district court sentenced
two defendants convicted on drug charges - one received an

verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts 'which the law
makes essential to the punishment,'.., and the judge exceeds his proper
authority." (quoting J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 87 (2d ed. 1872)). The
Blakely Court went on to explain the purposes behind the new sentencing
regime, reasoning that it provides notice to a defendant of the maximum
sentence that he is truly eligible to receive. Id. at 311-12. The former practice
in sentencing, which gave judges the right to enhance a sentence based on
facts that have not been proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, afforded
no notice to a defendant that his sentence could "balloon from as little as five
years to as much as life imprisonment." Id.
28. Id. at 313-14. In clarifying what constitutes a maximum sentence, the
Court said, "Our precedents make clear.., the 'statutory maximum' for
Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Id.
at 303. The Court concluded its majority decision by emphasizing that the
original intent of the Framers would not have considered "it too much to
demand that, before depriving a man of three more years of his liberty, the
State should suffer the modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to
'the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors'.., rather than
a lone employee of the State." Id. at 313-14 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769)).

29. Taking into account the two main factors - (1) the defendant's criminal
history and (2) the type of offense - a defendant who, for example, has no
criminal history would have zero criminal history points, therefore qualifying
for Criminal History Category I. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 10, § 4A1.1
(2006). Further, if that defendant committed, say, fraud in the amount of
250,000 dollars, he or she would be assigned a base offense level of seven. Id.
§ 2B1.1. When the amount involved in the offense is more than 5,000 dollars,
the Guidelines dictate the number of points to add to the base offense level
depending on the total loss amount involved. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(1). In this
example, a loss amount of 250,000 dollars would require that twelve points be
added to the base offense level, totaling nineteen for the offense level. Id.
§ 2Bl.1(b)(1)(a). With a Criminal History Category I and no reductions in the
offense level, the defendant is in Zone D of the Sentencing Table and in the
range of thirty to thirty-seven months imprisonment. Id. at ch.5, pt. A. When
a defendant qualifies for Zone D, he or she would not be eligible for probation
under the mandatory Guidelines scheme. Id. § 5B1.1 cmt. n.2.; see also id.
§ 5C1.1(f) (requiring that the minimum sentence for a defendant in Zone D be
satisfied by imprisonment).
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enhanced sentence," the other received a sentence within the
Guidelines range. 3'
The problem, however, was that both
defendants were eligible for enhanced sentences based on the
judge's own findings.3" Once again, the Sixth Amendment played
a critical role as Booker questioned whether the Apprendi rule
invalidated any part of the Guidelines. 33 Most importantly, the
Court pointed out that these issues as addressed would not have
arisen had the Guidelines not been mandatory. 4
In Booker, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Apprendi, that
"[any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to
support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the
facts established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be
admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt."3
However, the Court also held that the statutory

30. Booker, 543 U.S. at 227-29. Booker involved two defendants, Freddie J.
Booker and Ducan Fanfan. Id. at 220. The first, Freddie Booker, was
convicted of possession with the intent to distribute at least fifty grams of
cocaine base (crack). Id. at 227. Based on Booker's criminal history and the
amount of drugs involved as determined by the jury, the sentencing range
provided by the Guidelines was 210 to 262 months of imprisonment. Id. At
sentencing, the judge sentenced Booker to 360 months based on his own
determination by a preponderance of the evidence that Booker actually
possessed 566 grams more than what the jury determined. Id. The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the sentence was inconsistent with the
Apprendi rule and reversed. Id. at 227-28.
31. The second defendant, Ducan Fanfan, was found guilty of possessing
with intent to distribute at least five hundred grams of cocaine. Id. at 228.
The Guidelines provided for a sentence of not more than seventy-eight months
without additional findings of fact. Id. At sentencing, the judge maintained
Fanfan's sentence within the Guidelines, even though he found additional
facts supported by a preponderance of the evidence that would justify an
enhanced sentence of fifteen or sixteen years. Id. at 228-29.
32. According to the sentencing judge's findings, both Booker and Fanfan
qualified for an enhanced sentence. Id. at 227-28. Yet, only Booker received
an enhanced sentence, while Fanfan was sentenced under the original
Guideline range. Id. at 227-29. The Government challenged the judge's
decision not to sentence according to the enhancements. Id. at 229.
33. Id. at 229.
34. Id. at 233. Basically, the Court was faced with a conflict in which one
defendant received an enhanced sentence based on additional findings made
by the judge, whereas the other defendant's sentence was based solely on the
jury's verdict and was within the Guidelines. Id. at 227, 229.
35. Id. at 244. This meant that Booker's sentence violated the Sixth
Amendment since the judge had enhanced Booker's sentence based on his own
findings, in addition to the jury's verdict. Id. at 267. However, because the
judge chose not to enhance Fanfan's sentence based on his own findings,
Fanfan's sentence was solely based on the jury's verdict and did not violate the
Sixth Amendment. Id. Nevertheless, the judge remanded Fanfan's case for
re-sentencing in order to apply the new rules set forth in Booker. Id. at 26768.
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provisions that made the Guidelines mandatory, specifically 18
U.S.C. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e), must now be invalidated.36
Significantly, and most relevant to the issue at hand, Booker
emphasized that the Guidelines are merely advisory.17
Nevertheless, Booker required that judges must consider all of the
other factors laid out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in addition to the
Guidelines, which include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence
imposed... ; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of
sentence and the sentencing range established for... the applicable
category of offense committed by the applicable category of
defendant as set forth in the guidelines... ; (5) any pertinent policy
statement.., issued by the Sentencing Commission... (6) the need
to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 38

Booker forces judges to consider each defendant's
circumstances and "sentence the person before them as an
Moreover, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) includes specific
individual."'
36. Id. at 245. Section 3742(e) sets forth numerous provisions intended to
guide an appellate court in considering an appeal. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2000).
For example, the court of appeals may consider factors such as whether the
Guidelines were correctly applied to the case at hand or whether the sentence
"was imposed in violation of law". 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1). In omitting the
standards of review for appeal set forth in section 3742(e), Booker provides
that the same standard of review used in the past may still be used postBooker, namely the "review for 'unreasonable[ness].'" Booker, 543 U.S. at 261.
After Booker, either party may appeal regardless of whether the sentence is
within the Guideline range or not. Id. at 260.
37. See id. at 245 (stating that the Guidelines shall no longer be treated as
mandatory).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (emphasis added). Recent cases emphasize that the
Guidelines are only one of the factors to be considered, and that sentencing
courts may not overlook the factors set forth in section 3553(a). United States
v. Vaughn, 433 F.3d 917, 924 (7th Cir. 2006). Another case that was decided
in the wake of Booker is United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 676 (7th
Cir. 2005) (not to be confused with the aforementioned Cunningham v.
California, 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007), which requires a sentencing judge to
consider the circumstances of the case, the factors under section 3553(a), and
then determine if the Guideline range fairly accounts for those circumstances
and factors). The Court stated that a sentencing court "may not rest on the
guidelines alone." Id. The Cunningham Court further requires judges to
analyze the factors under section 3553(a) in relation to the circumstances of
the case at hand, rather than just reciting the factors in their opinions. Id. at
675-76, 679.
39. United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 987 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
The court in Ranum emphasized that when sentencing under Booker, courts
can no longer merely calculate the defendant's sentence range relying only on
the numbers and the Guidelines chart, but must consider the other statutory
factors. Id. at 987. For example, the court should also take into consideration
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language which embodies the principle of parsimony in
punishment, requiring that the judge impose a sentence
"sufficient, but not greater than necessary," to satisfy the four
statutory purposes of sentencing. 4' These purposes are:
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
41

effective manner.

Because the Court in Booker stressed the importance of these
other factors, it is incumbent upon judges to consider the physical
or mental health of a defendant during the sentencing phase,
where it ordinarily would not have been allowed pre-Booker when
the Guidelines were mandatory.42
C. The Harsh Truth Post-Booker
In the post-Booker era, the Guidelines are merely advisory,
thereby allowing judges to exercise much more discretion. 3
However, this does not seem to be the case in reality as this
permittable exercise of discretion has not resulted in judges
granting lower sentences, save for a few exceptions. 4 In fact, the
the "history and characteristics of the defendant." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (emphasis added).
42. Prior to Booker, courts were required to refrain from considering certain
characteristics specific to the defendant, such as age, education, mental and
physical conditions, employment history, and family relationships, unless they
were dealing with "exceptional cases." See GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note

10, §§ 5H1.1-5H1.6 (stipulating that a sentencing court may not consider these
specific offender characteristics when deciding whether or not to give a lower
sentence because they are "not ordinarily relevant").
43. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245.
44. While most courts' sentences continue to climb, there has been a small
trend in a very limited number of courts which have developed a pattern of
granting lower sentences for defendants post-Booker. The district court for the
Southern District of New York provides numerous cases in which the court
granted the defendant a lower sentence due to his or her physical condition.
See, e.g., United States v. Carmona-Rodriguez, No. 04 CR 667(RWS), 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6254, at *11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2005) (imposing lower
sentence when defendant suffered from diabetes, high blood pressure, anxiety,
and depression); United States v. Jiminez, 212 F. Supp. 2d 214, 220 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (sentencing defendant to lower sentence when she suffered from a brain
aneurism, severe memory loss, and psychotic symptoms); United States v.
Roth, No. 94 CR 726(RWS), 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 996, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
30, 1995) (granting lower sentence for a defendant battling a severely
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average sentence length has increased post-Booker for most major
crimes." Moreover, in most cases, the courts have generally held
the bar extremely high, requiring that the defendant have
extraordinarily serious medical conditions before considering a
What is perhaps more alarming is the
non-prison sentence."

debilitating disease known as amyotrophic lateral sclerosis).
The district court for the District of Massachusetts has consistently taken into
account defendants' medical conditions and, on numerous occasions, granted
downward departures. See, e.g., United States v. Pineyro, 372 F. Supp. 2d
133, 136-37, 139-40 (D. Mass. 2005) (sentencing defendant to "time served"
when he suffered from heterotrophic ossification, accompanied by chronic back
pain, as well as impulse control disorder and severe depression); United States
v. Willis, 322 F. Supp. 2d 76, 79-80, 84-85 (D. Mass. 2004) (listing over twenty
troubling medical conditions of defendant and finding home confinement more
appropriate than a prison sentence); United States v. Baron, 914 F. Supp. 660,
663 (D. Mass. 1995) (addressing each of defendant's serious medical
conditions, including his severe problems with pituitary tumors, kidney
disease, potential prostate cancer, coronary artery disease, and hypertension,
and ultimately granting downward departure). Despite the advances that
these courts have made toward using their discretion to provide more effective
medical treatment for defendants, these advances are the exception, not the
mainstream majority.
45. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N SPECIAL POST-

According to the Sentencing
BOOEER CODING PROJECT 13-15 (2006).
Commission's most recent report, the average sentence length for offenses
such as drug trafficking, firearms, theft, and fraud have continued to climb,
showing an especially significant increase in sentence length from 2003 to
2004. Id.; see also David McColgin & Brett G. Sweitzer, Grid & Bear It: PostBooker Sentencing Litigation Strategies - Part One, THE CHAMPION, Nov.
2005, at 50 (recognizing that the duration of sentences has steadily increased).
While it was expected that post-Booker sentencing would mean "increased
judicial discretion leading to sentences customized to individual defendants'
circumstances" (in effect, leading to overall lower sentences), what has
actually happened is quite the contrary. Id.; see also Kathleen M. Williams,
Fed. Pub. Defender for S.D. Fla., Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments
Before the U.S. Sentencing Comm'n (Mar. 15, 2006) (urging the Sentencing
Commission to recognize the increasing length in sentences, in particular,
bringing notice to the fact that the length of sentences has doubled over the
past twenty years). Moreover, the Commission continues to amend the
Guidelines, consistently inserting more "aggravating factors" into the
Guidelines that would increase a defendant's sentence, and hardly ever
incorporating new "mitigating factors" that would lower a defendant's
sentence. Id. In fact, over the years, the Sentencing Commission has even
eliminated numerous provisions that set forth mitigating factors. Id.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Sherman, 53 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 1995)
(discussing various prior court rulings on what constituted "extraordinary
physical impairment"). In previous cases, it was not extraordinary enough for
the defendant to suffer from a heart condition that was manageable with
medicine or that the defendant was a "wheelchair bound quadriplegic." Id.
(citing Weinstein v. United States, 115 S.Ct. 250 (1994); United States v. Goff,
6 F.3d 363, 366 (6th Cir. 1993)). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
stipulated that the following conditions would not be extraordinary enough
without particularized findings: "borderline mental retardation, chronic major
depressive disorder, scoliosis and disabling back pain." Id. (citing United
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recently proposed "Sentencing Fairness and Equity Restoration
Act," which would rob judges of their newfound sentencing
discretion by inhibiting judges from sentencing a defendant below
a certain range.47
D. When Did Our PrisonsBecome Our Hospitalsand Asylums?
In 2005, the total inmate population across the United States
soared past the two million mark, with approximately 191,000
inmates in federal prisons alone.48 Astonishingly, nearly forty-five
percent of those federal inmates reported suffering from a mental
illness.49 Likewise, the percentage of those reporting physical
medical problems was nearly thirty-nine percent of federal
inmates aged forty-five years or older.5 0
What is even more
unsettling is the inadequate medical treatment in prison and the
devastating effects it has had on these inmates."
So the
States v. Slater, 971 F.2d 626, 634-35 (10th Cir. 1992)). The one example the
Sherman court provided which would warrant a lower sentence is a case
involving the "double amputee whose treatment would be jeopardized in
prison." Id. (citing United States v. Greenwood, 928 F.2d 645, 646 (4th Cir.
1991)).
47. Sensenbrenner Introduces Legislation to Restore Fairnessand Equity to
Federal Sentencing, U.S. NEwSWIRE, Sept. 29, 2006. This bill directly attacks
a judge's right to grant downward departures from the Guidelines. Rep.
Sensenbrenner proposed in this bill what is known as "the Booker fix," which
would restrict sentencing courts by requiring them to sentence within a
certain range. On the low end, judges could not sentence anywhere below the
Guidelines range applicable to that defendant and his offense; on the high end,
judges could not sentence above the statutory maximum for that particular
offense. Id. The bill would place further restrictions on downward departures,
mainly effectuating a more stringent standard of review (Sensenbrenner
pushes for de novo review, as opposed to the "reasonableness" review set forth
in Booker) and more requirements for filing motions for downward departures.
Id. This bill, if passed, would ultimately return us to a system of mandatory
sentences, which is directly contrary to Booker's holding. While this bill was
not passed in the last session of Congress, its supporters introduced it again in
the 110th Congress where it sits for consideration. GovTrack.us, H.R. 993
[110th]: Sentencing Fairness and Equity Restoration Act of 2007, 110th
Congress (2007), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=
h110-993.
48. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN:
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006 2, tbl. 1 (2007).
49. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL
REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 3, tbl.2
(2006).
50. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MEDICAL
PROBLEMS OF INMATES, 1997 3, tbl.2 (2001).

51. See infra Part III (discussing the inadequacy of BOP's medical
treatment).
See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED: U.S.
PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 1 (2003); B. Jaye Anno, et al.,

Correctional Health Care: Addressing the Needs of Elderly, Chronically Ill,
and Terminally Ill Inmates NAT'L INST. OF CORR. (Washington, D.C.),
February 2004, at 10; United States v. Sherman, 53 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir.
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unavoidable question remains: Why continue to overpopulate our
prisons when defendants would receive better medical treatment
outside of prison, and the objectives of punishment can still be
fulfilled through non-prison sentences? Although Booker grants
judges the discretion to impose more non-prison sentences, the
harsh truth is that prison populations are still rising
exponentially, that the prisons themselves continue to operate
understaffed and under-financed,52 and, most disturbingly, that
mentally and physically ill prisoners are slowly wasting away in
these prisons."
III. UNCOVERING THE "BOP PLAGUE": THE BUREAU OF PRISONS'
INABILITY TO TREAT THE MENTALLY AND PHYSICALLY ILL

When considering the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), as
required by Booker, courts must sentence an individual to a
punishment that is "sufficient but not greater than necessary to
satisfy the purposes of sentencing." 4 Moreover, a sentencing court
must take into account the most effective medical treatment for the
defendant when determining a sentence.55 Now, what courts must
begin to recognize are the devastating consequences that flow from
sentencing a mentally or physically ill defendant to a term of
imprisonment, especially where the facility is understaffed and not
equipped to handle such conditions.
The BOP cannot claim to meet the medical needs of its
inmates when it has been overpopulated and understaffed for
years. According to a report from the Bureau of Justice Statistics,
federal prisons were operating at one hundred and forty percent
capacity in 2004, and have been operating above capacity for over
a decade.5" In 2005, the federal prison system held the largest
1995).
52. GIBBONS & KATZENBACH, supra note 2, at 43; see also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 51, at 95-100 (uncovering the numerous repercussions
suffered by mentally ill inmates due to the inadequate medical staffing in
prisons).
53. See, e.g., NAT'L INST. OF CORR., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROVISION OF
MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN PRISONS 1 (Feb. 2001) (reporting that "previously
recognized mental health issues may be exacerbated in the stressful
environment of the prison"); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 53
(arguing that prisons are "toxic" for the mentally ill, as they struggle to
survive in a "brutalizing" setting in which they are "ill-equipped to navigate").
54. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (emphasis added); see also United States v.
Spigner, 416 F.3d 708, 712 (8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a sentencing court
must sentence defendant in a way that contemplates the defendant's need for
treatment).
56. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN:
PRISONERS IN 2004 7, tbl. 8 (2005). This represents an overpopulation by a
gut-wrenching forty percent. Id. It places the federal prison system in the top

five most overpopulated facilities out of all of the jails and prisons in the entire
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population of inmates among all prison and jail facilities, housing
nearly 185,000 inmates - growing over twice as fast as the state
inmate population.57 Additionally, a recent report concluded that
the "federal system account[ed] for over twenty-five percent" of the
exponential population growth within the entire jail and prison
system from June 2004 to June 2005.'
Even worse, the BOP has continued to eliminate many of the
medical programs utilized in treating defendants with mental and
physical problems, as well as those programs used for
These reductions made by the BOP "make
rehabilitation.59
punishment harsher and eliminate treatment and rehabilitation
opportunities that judges have recommended or assumed were
available in the past, for reasons that have nothing to do with the
purposes of punishment."'
The most significant problem,
however, is that the prisons are understaffed.6 Due to a high
nation, including state and federal together. Id. Sadly enough, this has been
the trend for the past several years; yet another report showed that the federal
prisons were operating at 134% capacity in 2000. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND FEDERAL
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES, 2000 4, tbl. 6 (2003); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 1994 7, tbl. 8
(1995) (reporting that the federal prison system was operating at 125%
capacity). The most recent report, dated in 2005, stated that federal prisons
were operating at 134% capacity. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2005 7, tbl. 8 (2006).
57. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BULLETIN:
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2005 1 (2006). It is estimated that this
figure had already risen to 188,000 by the time the report was released.
Williams, supra note 45.
58. Id. at 3. In fact, the prison population is now four times the size it was
in 1980. Bergman, supra note 2, at 4.
59. Williams, supra note 45.
60. Amy Baron-Evans, Sentencing Post-Booker, SENT'G RESOURCE COUNSEL
(Oct. 12, 2005), available at http://www.fd.org/pdf lib/sentencing%20post
bookerl01205.pdf. The "quality and regularity of medical and mental health
care" have plummeted as a result of these drastic restrictions. Id.
61. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 95. The ratio of available
medical staff to inmates is so overwhelming that they cannot possibly provide
adequate treatment to the inmates who need it. Id. at 96-97. Because of the
poor pay and the overwhelming amount of work, turnover rates have
skyrocketed. Id. at 97. In turn, prison patients suffer the repercussions of
their physicians or psychologists constantly being replaced, having to rebuild
trust and familiarizing the new doctor with their specific medical problems
and histories. Id. Even worse, this leads to under-familiarized, "undertrained, and under-qualified personnel... making clinical decisions about
appropriate treatment[s]" of prisoner patients. Id. at 100.
Additionally, the ramifications of understaffing are clearly evident
when taking a closer look at the psychological services provided in federal
prison. Only one federal prison met the authorized staffing requirements to
satisfy an appropriate patient-psychologist ratio. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, HEALTH, EDUC., AND HUMAN SERVICES DIV., BUREAU OF PRISONS
HEALTH CARE: INMATES' ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE IS LIMITED BY LACK OF
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turnover rate and a dearth of funding, the BOP lacks qualified
physicians to treat mentally and physically ill patients in prison.
The majority of physicians' assistants employed by the BOP in
prisons are unlicensed and non-certified.62
A. Physical Health Concerns and the BOP
1. Age Does Matter
One of the most crucial, and most relevant characteristics of a
person's physical well-being, is his or her age.
While the
Guidelines state that age should normally not be considered when
sentencing a defendant,' age is relevant to an older defendant and
should be considered in relation to the first factor under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a): "the history and characteristics of the defendant."' The
population of elderly inmates has drastically climbed since 1992.6"
Unfortunately, the BOP is not well-equipped to handle inmates
with "mobility impairments," which are usually attributed to
arthritis or diabetes.66 Older female inmates, who make up a
rapidly growing portion of the prison population, pose immense
treatment challenges to the BOP due to their "unique set of health
care needs."67 Imprisonment also accelerates the aging process,
and does so at an even higher rate when the inmate is suffering

CLINICAL STAFF 6 (1994). In order to meet the proper ratio of twenty to
twenty-five patients per psychiatrist, a prison with three hundred mentally ill
patients would need to employ twelve psychiatrists. Id. at 5. Shockingly, one
prison that held 300 mentally ill inmates only authorized seven psychiatrist
positions, and maintained only four psychiatrists on staff. Id. For an entire
month, this same prison had only one psychiatrist on staff, and later lowered
the authorized number of psychiatrists to five for the entire facility. Id.
62. Id. at 2. Reports indicate that the inmates were being treated by
unsupervised physicians' assistants, not actually licensed physicians, because
of understaffing and lack of time. Id. However, to the inmates' dismay, "many
physician assistants did not meet the training and certification requirements
of the medical community outside of BOP." Id. at 3. Some federal facilities
were only treating inmates afflicted with severe illnesses, ignoring inmates
battling serious, but not severe enough, illnesses. Id. Because of the failure to
employ an adequate number of psychiatrists for each facility, mentally ill
inmates were not receiving the recommended therapy sessions. Id. As a
direct result, inmates suffering from physical or mental illness were "at risk of
serious deterioration." Id. at 2-3.
63. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 10, § 5H1.1.
64. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
65. Anno, et al., supra note 51, at 7, exh. 1. The number of elderly inmates
imprisoned in 2001 reached well over 100,000 in the entire prison system. Id.
66. Id. at 20.
67. Rebecca Reviere & Vernetta D. Young, Aging Behind Bars: Health Care
for Older Female Inmates, 16 J. OF WOMEN & AGING 55, 64 (2004). Moreover,
the number of female prisoners is rapidly increasing. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, supra note 56, at 4 (noting that the female population is rising
more than twice as fast as the male prison population).
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from a chronic illness (e.g., arthritis, hypertension, or diabetes),
increasing the physical age of a person by eleven-and-a-half years
more than one's actual age.' Furthermore, high emotional stress
and physical deterioration are common results of imprisonment of
elderly defendants due to their "vulnerability to abuse and
predation."69
2. DiseaseRunning Rampant
Because of the small, enclosed spaces and overpopulation,
prisons have become "serious incubator[s] of disease."" Those
diseases of greatest concern are HIV, hepatitis C, hepatitis B, and
tuberculosis.71
Yet, the data collected on prison populations'
physical well-being is meager, to say the least.72 Nevertheless, the
incidences of these serious diseases in prison are exceedingly
higher than in the common population.73
B. Mental Illness and the BOP
The amount of information regarding the inadequacy of the
BOP in treating mentally ill prisoners is overwhelming. In 2006,
the federal inmate population has been estimated to hold 70,200
individuals with a history of mental illness issues.74 Mental

68. Anno, et al., supra note 51, at 10. In terms of physical aging, every year
an elderly person spends in prison is equivalent to eleven-and-a-half years.
For example, a sixty-eight year old woman, who was also combating a chronic
illness would likely have the physical well-being of at least an eighty year old
woman after only one year of imprisonment. In theory, sentencing an elderly
defendant to five years in prison could actually have the effect of sentencing
him or her to over fifty-five years. Clearly, these statistics show that the BOP
is not equipped to handle elderly defendants.
69. Id. at 9.
70. Alan Elsner, Prison Health Issues, THE CHAMPION, Aug. 2004, at 36, 40.
71. Id. This is partially due to the fact that inmates have no source for
clean needles or condoms since the prisons refuse to provide them. Id.
72. See id. (discussing how the prison systems generally fail to adequately
and accurately obtain figures on their own inmates and the sicknesses and
diseases that inflict them).
73. Id. The occurrences of HIV inside prison were reported as four times
higher than outside prison. Id. On a grander scale, rates of tuberculosis
inside prison were eleven times as high as that in the general population. Id.
74. Stephanie Lambidakis, Mentally Ill, And Behind Bars, CBS NEWS
6,
2006), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/09/06/health/mainl
(Sept.
1980075.shtml. The most prevalent occurrences of mental illnesses were
found among the female state prison population, with seventy-three percent
reporting a mental illness. Id. Further statistics gathered from state facilities
showed that over seventy-five percent of the prison population had issues with
substance abuse, and twenty-five percent had experienced physical or sexual
abuse. Id. Using the mid-2006 federal population figure of 188,000, this
would mean that nearly forty percent of federal inmates were suffering from a
mental illness. Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments Before the U.S.
Sentencing Commission, supra note 45.
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Health America instructs that "there is now widespread concern
regarding the unmet needs of persons with mental illness in the
nation's jails and prisons and the toll it exacts on these
individuals, their families, service agencies, and the criminal
justice system." 6 First, there are a limited number of beds, which
are reserved only for those inmates with the most serious mental
illnesses.7 This forces others with significant, but less serious,
mental illnesses to live in the general population in prison.7' This
unjust situation illustrates a need for a level of "intermediate care"
for those who may not have a completely debilitating mental
illness, but still experience problems functioning with inmates in
the general population.
In terms of policy, the BOP's goals are misplaced.8 ° Most
mentally ill inmates are usually provided treatment involving
nothing more than mere medication, rarely receiving any
meaningful type of therapy or counseling to help with their mental
illness."1
A pre-existing mental illness will undoubtedly grow
75. Mental Health America ("MHA"), History of the Organization and the
Movement, http://www.nmha.orgindex.cfm?objectid=DA2FOOOD-1372-4D20C8882D19A97973AA (last visited Feb. 14, 2008). MHA was formerly known
as National Mental Health Assiciation. Id. The institution changed to its
current name in November 2006. Id.
76. MHA, Position Statement 52: In Support of Maximum Diversion of
Persons with Serious Mental Illness from the Criminal Justice System (2003)
http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/go/position-statements/52.
MHA strongly promotes "maximum diversion" for mentally ill
defendants. Id. The MHA primarily advocates for placement in a mental
facility rather than a prison. Id. Barbara Bergman further points out in her
article that nearly half of mentally ill inmates are doing time for non-violent
crimes. Bergman, supra note 2, at 4.
77. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 128.
78. Id.
79. Id.

80. Many of the BOP's facilities are specifically "designed for punishment."
Bergman, supra note 2, at 4. Prison staff members, who generally have not
received sufficient training for dealing with mentally ill inmates, often
mistake a mentally ill inmate who is acting out as disobeying orders in order
to cause trouble. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, United States:
Mentally Ill Mistreated in Prison (Oct. 22, 2003) available at:
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/10/22/usdom6472.htm.
Prisoners
have
actually been punished for what should have been seen as a cry for help. Id.
For instance, where an inmate tried to commit suicide or self-mutilation, he
was punished for "destroying state property." Id. Likewise, when a defendant
was having a delusional fit, he was punished for a "battery," and where a
defendant was kicking and screaming in response to hearing voices, he was
punished for "creating a disturbance." Id.
81. Bergman, supra note 2, at 4.
In addition, live sessions with
psychologists and psychiatrists are being replaced with computer
consultations, referred to as Telemedicine. NAT'L. INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TELEMEDICINE CAN REDUCE CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE
COSTS: AN EVALUATION OF A PRISON TELEMEDICINE NETWORK 11 (1999). As a

result, previous patient-physician relationships are broken and the patient is
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exceedingly worse in a prison setting.82 Just as the elderly are
more likely to be victimized in prison,83 so are mentally ill
inmates. ' Inevitably, mentally ill inmates face a bleak future due
to the "deep-rooted patterns of neglect, mistreatment, and even
cavalier disregard for the well-being of vulnerable and sick human
beings.". Because of the significant problems that have continued
to plague the BOP, certain inmates, such as the elderly, women,
and those suffering from a chronic illness, are being sentenced to a
debilitating lifestyle, and, just as the statistics show, they will
physically and mentally deteriorate due to the lack of adequate
healthcare within the BOP.
IV.

SENTENCING: ARE JUDGES TURNING A BLIND

EYE?

To reiterate, Booker provided that judges must take into
account the statutory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when
sentencing," which includes the specific characteristics of the
defendant.87 In addition, there are several other sources that urge
judges to consider the physical and mental health of the defendant
when sentencing.
A. Statutory Provisions
The first relevant statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 994(k),
emphasizes that courts should not use a prison sentence as a
means to provide medical treatment for a person.' Furthermore,
Congress provides under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 that "imprisonment is
not an appropriate means of promoting correction and

forced to spill his emotions to a computer screen. Physicians have criticized
Telemedicine thus far, claiming that it cannot accurately evaluate patients,
and foreseeing a deterioration in the already poor quality of healthcare in
prisons. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Telemedicine Reimbursement: Raising the
Iron Triangle to a New Plateau, 13 HEALTH MATRIX 371, 394-95 (2003).
82. See NAT'L INST. OF CORR., supra note 53, at 1 (emphasizing that mental
conditions "may be exacerbated" due to the stress the prison setting places on
an individual); see also Press Release, Human Rights Watch, supra note 80
(quoting director of Human Rights Watch, Jamie Fellner, who stated that
"prison can be the worst place to be" for those defendants suffering from a
mental illness).

83. Anno, et al., supra note 51, at 9.
84. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 2.
85. Id. at 2.
86. Booker, 543 U.S. at 245-46.
87. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
88. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (requiring that "the guidelines reflect the
inappropriateness of imposing a sentence of a term of imprisonment for the
purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment") (emphasis added).
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rehabilitation."89 This evinces that prison is primarily, and, above
all, meant for punishment.
A more recent development in several state legislatures is the
introduction of the Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime
Reduction Act of 2004, which has been implemented in Ohio.90
This Act establishes a "mental health court" used to separately
assess the treatment needs of mentally ill defendants and provides
means of "alternative prosecution."" This Act only applies at the
state and local levels,9" leaving the federal system in its traditional
post, holding mentally and physically ill defendants to the same
standards as a person in perfect health. Moreover, the Act does
not address those individuals with serious physical health
problems." Those individuals, in substantial need of consistent
and ongoing medical care, are sentenced in the same way as a
physically fit defendant in both the state and federal criminal
systems.
B. Paving the Way for a More Adequate Sentencing Regime for
Physically and Mentally Ill Defendants
Judges are just beginning to more carefully consider the
physical and mental conditions of the individuals before them. In
many cases, courts still overlook alternatives to imprisonment
based on where a defendant falls on the Guidelines Sentencing
Table, when they could easily grant a modest departure or
variance from the Guideline range to impose a non-prison
sentence.94 During the sentencing phase in a few cases, though,
judges have shown concern for defendants that were afflicted with
severe medical problems.9"

89. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a). Congress specifies that the factors under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) must be considered when a judge is deciding if a defendant should be
sentenced to prison at all, implying that there are definitely instances in
which prison would be completely inappropriate after taking into account the
3553(a) factors. Id.
90. Pub. L. No. 108-414, §§ 1-2991, 118 Stat. 2327, 2327-36 (2004); see infra
note 127 (discussing the system implemented in Ohio).
91. See id. § 3(2), (3), 118 Stat. 2328 (establishing a mental health judicial
system); see also § 2991(b)(5)(c)(ii)(V), 118 Stat. 2332 (providing alternatives to
prosecution, such as placing the defendant in "community-based mental
health services" rather than in prison); 42 U.S.C. § 3796ii (Supp. 2006)
(setting forth generally the organization, administration, and financial grants
for a mental health court).
92. § 2991(a)(1),(3), 118 Stat. 2328-29.
93. See id. at § 2991(a)(9), 118 Stat. 2330 (defining a "preliminary qualified
offender" as one with a diagnosed "mental illness").
94. See United States v. Wright, 218 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2000)
(explaining the appropriateness of sentencing a defendant to probation instead
of incarceration when it involves only a small departure); 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2).

95. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 363 F.3d 25, 58 (1st Cir. 2004)
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Another step towards more appropriate sentencing for the
mentally and physically ill has been the recent rejection of
generalized letters from the BOP touting its purported ability to
treat a wide variety of medical illnesses.96 In the past, letters from
the BOP were submitted by the prosecution at sentencing to
(showing concern about prison's ability to treat defendant with Crohn's
disease); United States v. Derbes, 369 F.3d 579, 581 (1st Cir. 2004)
(recognizing the possibility of a great degree of individualized care required for
a defendant suffering from psychiatric problems).
In Martin, the district court sentenced defendant, Daniel Martin, to
three years of probation after departing downwards three levels due to his
"exceptional physical impairments." Martin, 363 F.3d at 33. Suffering from
Crohn's disease, suppression of his immune system, Bell's palsy, and
osteoporosis, Martin satisfied the definition of "extraordinary physical
impairment." Id. at 49-50. Martin's treating physician testified that if Martin
was not able to receive immediate attention at the onset of an episode
involving great abdominal pain, and further, if there was an interruption in
his medication regimen, urgent and major surgery would be inevitable. Id.
The First Circuit found that the BOP would not be able to sufficiently care for
Martin's fragile physical health conditions and upheld the district court's
three level departure based on physical impairment. Id. at 50. However,
Martin's sentence was vacated on other grounds. Id. at 51.
In Derbes, Frank Derbes was dealing with serious depression and
suicidal thoughts, needing extensive medical care. Derbes, 369 F.3d at 581.
The district judge took into account Derbes' mental conditions in evaluating
his sentence and recognized that while the BOP may be able to treat those
mental conditions, it would definitely not be able to fill the void left from
stripping the defendant of his longtime connection with his psychiatrist were
the court to impose a prison sentence. Id. at 580. For over seven years,
Derbe's psychiatrist had been providing "individual therapy as well as
medication monitoring." Id. at 581. The psychiatrist testified that it had been
extremely difficult to discover the best method of treating Derbes' mental
conditions, taking years before they found an effective medication regimen,
and that he was especially worried that this regimen would not be able to
continue in prison. Id. The BOP also would not be able to provide the same
monitoring and close care as Derbes needed (and was, in fact, already
receiving). Id.
Based on its review of the decision below, the First Circuit remanded
the Derbes case in order to further explore the record for more evidence that
the BOP would not be able to treat Derbes. Id. at 582-83. On remand, the
defendant pursued other grounds for departure rather than on a mental
health basis. United States v. Derbes, No. 02-10391-RGS, 2004 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19666, at *4 (D. Mass. Oct. 1, 2004). Both the Martin and Derbes cases
illustrate the very beginnings of judges using their discretion to find more
effective means of punishment and deterrence while also attempting to assure
proper healthcare to the defendant.
96. See, e.g., Martin, 363 F.3d at 50 (rejecting the BOP's letters because
they did not distinctly focus on Martin's medical condition, and requiring more
than mere "boilerplate language" from the BOP in order to determine if it can
adequately treat a defendant); Derbes, 369 F.3d at 582 (noting that "general
assurances" made by the BOP or the government are not "given much
weight"); United States v. Gee, 226 F.3d 885, 902 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting
another "boilerplate" letter in which the BOP boasted that it could treat
"medical conditions of all kinds").
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appease any hesitation a judge might have as to the treatment of a
physically or mentally ill defendant. 97 A court's rejection of such
letters is still a recent concept, and BOP letters continue to be
submitted in cases involving physically or mentally ill defendants.
Sadly, some courts are unable to see past these misleading letters,
which claim the ability to provide ample treatment. Many times,
the BOP knows well that such treatment may not even be
available to the defendant.98
C. Holding the Bar High
Despite these efforts, in most cases, such as in United States
v. Sherman,' the courts have generally required extraordinary
medical conditions before considering a non-prison sentence."' In
Sherman, the court vacated a below-Guidelines sentence when the
defendant testified that he weighed over four hundred pounds,
suffered from arthritis, and had great difficulty breathing.'
The
district court had sentenced defendant Sherman below the
Guidelines range due to his medical conditions by reasoning that
the BOP tends to overlook asthma as a medical condition and that
his weight met the requirement of being extraordinary. ° The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence and
remanded, requiring a much stronger basis for warranting a
downward departure from the Guidelines, such as medical
findings that either the defendant would require extremely
97. In the Martin case, the government provided two letters from the BOP
to attempt to show that the BOP could treat Crohn's disease. Martin, 363
F.3d at 50. The first gave a brief overview of the BOP's medical screening
process and then concluded that it had the ability to treat the defendant,
despite his individual difficulties setting him apart from others suffering from
the same disease. Id. The second letter generally addressed the nutrition
regimen for other inmates suffering from Crohn's disease, but failed to propose
any sort of individualized treatment for the defendant. Id. In Derbes, the
government submitted a letter from the BOP stating that the "BOP offers
inmates a full range of mental health services." Derbes, 369 F.3d at 582
(citing FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE LEGAL RESOURCE
GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 31 (2003)). In the Gee case, the
government offered a letter from the BOP in which it boasted that it could
treat "all kinds" of medical problems. Gee, 226 F.3d at 902.
98. See also infra note 137 (describing the BOP's manipulative and tricky
ways in trying to appease judges' hesitations about available healthcare
programs in prison).
99. 53 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2005).
100. See id. at 788 (using various findings from other courts in order to
determine what constituted "extraordinary physical impairment"). Raymond
Sherman pled guilty to possession of a sawed-off shotgun. Id. at 783. At his
sentencing, Sherman stated that he suffered from obesity, weighed over 400
pounds, had asthma, and experienced breathing problems when undertaking
extremely minor activities. Id. at 784-85.
101. Sherman, 53 F.3d at 784-85.
102. Id. at 785.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[41:219

extensive care and that the BOP would not be able to provide such
This second requirement lies more aptly in the hands of
care.
the government because it has better access to obtaining that type
of information from the BOP. However, this would then pose a
Relying on the government's own
"Catch 22" scenario.
allow
the government to provide selfwould
representations
serving support. Moreover, the government certainly would not be
willing to admit the downfalls of the prison system to which it
hopes to send the defendant, nor would it admit the likelihood that
a defendant's poor medical condition would deteriorate in prison.
Either way, the burden is too great for a defendant to bear and
proves to be an unfair and unreliable method for determining
whether a lower sentence is warranted.
D. No Such Thing as "Wait and See"
Another possible option is a "wait and see" approach.
However, upon close examination, this proves to be yet another
faulty alternative. Once a judge has imposed a sentence, the court
does not have the power to later modify that sentence unless the
BOP first files a motion."' Thus, the "wait and see" approach is
not an effective resolution of the problem because it is counterdependant on the BOP system taking the initial action." 5 This
103. Id. at 786-88; see also supra note 46 (illustrating how the Court has
wrestled with defining "extraordinary physical impairment"). The definition
of "extraordinary physical impairment" has grown exceedingly more difficult
to meet. In the more recent case, Martin, the court further attempts to define
an "extraordinary physical impairment," imposing an extremely difficult
burden on the defendant, and requiring him/her to show one of two things: (1)
that his/her life would be threatened while in prison due to his condition or (2)
that the BOP would not be able to treat his/her conditions. Martin, 363 F.3d
at 49.
104. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Y'Iore so, even after the motion has been filed, the
court may only lower the sentence if it determines that "extraordinary and
compelling reasons" allow that reduction, and that reduction is consistent with
the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the policy statements of the U.S.
Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
105. See, e.g., Jeremiah Stettler, Dying Woman Denied PrisonRelease, SALT
LAKE TRIBUNE, Nov. 10, 2006, at Local (portraying the case of a woman who
brought a due process claim after her medical needs were not met once she
was sentenced to prison). In this case, Tracy Sanchez was convicted of
heading a drug trafficking ring and sentenced to 360 months of imprisonment.
Id. Sanchez requested "compassionate release" from the BOP because she was
suffering from a terminal illness, which left her only two months to live. Id.
She was only thirty-six years old and would obviously not live to finish her
term in prison. Id. Sanchez claimed that the lower court "violated her due
process rights by promising her adequate medical coverage at the time of
sentencing, and then not providing it." Id. Unfortunately, the Court of
Appeals ruled against her. Id. The court failed to sympathize with Sanchez's
two-part battle: a terminal illness and a lack of appropriate medical care in
prison. Id. Shockingly the Court of Appeals reasoned that Sanchez "failed to
articulate why her condition should result in a different sentence." Id.
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approach ignores the realities of the very system it operates in and
does not provide for an appropriate sentence for mentally and
physically ill defendants.
V. Is

BOOKER THE LIGHT AT THE END OF OUR TUNNEL?

We0 6are products of our past, but we don't have to be prisoners of
1
it.

Even though Booker explicitly abolished the mandatory
nature of the Guidelines, judges consistently sentence defendants
within the Guideline range because they are fearful to sentence
"outside the box."' 07 Therefore, a two-fold problem still remains:
How do we achieve fairer sentencing procedures under Booker, and
remedy the overcrowding and inadequate medical care in prison?
As discussed in previous sections, the attempts to correct the
problem either leave enormous holes to be filled, or simply
overlook the problem."8°
This Comment proposes several new
remedies for attacking the BOP plague by delegating specific
approaches to, first, the courts and judges, second, to Congress and
the Sentencing Commission, and lastly, to the BOP.
A. A Call to Judges to Break Free from the Shackles of
the Pre-BookerEra.
Upon closer examination, it becomes evident that judges are
acting as "prisoners" in this conflict. Judges restrict themselves to
sentencing defendants within the Guidelines, even though the
Guidelines are to be treated as advisory post Booker. Because
judges are granted much more discretion under Booker, they must
not be fearful of imposing sentences below the Guideline range. In
light of Booker and the factors to be considered under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), judges must be more open-minded to sentences
involving home confinement and proba'tion for physically and
mentally ill defendants."10
To impose, a reasonable and just

106. RICK WARREN, THE PURPOSE-DRIVEN LIFE JOURNAL Day 3 (Janice
Jacobson ed. 2002).
107. Hon. Tim Leonard, 2004-2005 Supreme Court Review: Symposium
Foreword, 41 TULSA L. REV. 117, 120 (2005) (pointing out that many judges

today treat the Guidelines as if they were still mandatory).
108. See supra Part IV (discussing the various efforts toward a solution to
the lack of medical care in prison and attempts at providing fairer sentencing
procedures, and how these attempts have failed to adequately address the
problem).

109. Section 3553(a)(1) requires that sentencing courts consider the
characteristics of the defendant, while section 3553(a)(2) stipulates that one of
the main goals of sentencing is to provide the defendant with needed medical
care in the "most effective manner." 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2). Taken
together, these two provisions, mandate that characteristics, such as having a
chronic illness, physical ailments, or mental or emotional conditions, must be
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sentence, the courts cannot ignore the individual circumstances of
each defendant, and therefore must impose a sentence that will
most effectively treat the individual's conditions. In effect, judges
can and must fashion a pattern of non-prison sentences for those
battling physical and mental illnesses.
1. Combating the "Extraordinary"
Requirement: Creatinga
Middle Ground Between a Non-existent and an "Extraordinary"
Medical Impairment
Even after Booker, courts today require that the defendant
suffer from an "extraordinary" medical impairment for the judge to
consider a non-prison sentence."0 To maintain this stringent view
presently imposed by judges is to impose an "all or nothing"
viewpoint: Either the defendant has an extraordinary impairment,
or he or she is treated the same as any other healthy defendant.
Using their discretion under Booker, judges must create a middle
ground to provide a sentence for defendants suffering from a
significant physical or mental illness (even though it may not be
extraordinary), especially where a defendant has an effective
treatment plan already in place."' Judges must balance the
objectives of punishment and deterrence while also2 allowing those
defendants to receive adequate medical treatment.1
taken into account. Thus, judges cannot ignore the crucial question of how the
defendant will receive the most effective healthcare. Clearly, based on the
statistics set forth in Part III, prison is not the answer. See supra Part III
(discussing the inadequate healthcare in the BOP).
110. See Sherman, 53 F.3d at 788 (attempting to dissect the meaning of
"extraordinary physical impairment").
The various cases discussed in
Sherman mandated a shockingly high standard for the defendant to meet in
order for his mental or physical illness to qualify as "extraordinary." Id. The
prior decisions blatantly rejected heart conditions, paralysis, borderline
mental retardation, chronic major depressive disorder, and scoliosis as
"extraordinary" enough to meet that standard. Id.
111. See, e.g., Derbes, 369 F.3d at 580-81 (discussing the lower court's
emphasis on the importance of maintaining the defendant's treatment plan by
his psychiatrist and the significance of enabling him to continue treatment
under the same psychiatrist).
112. The objectives of sentencing are to provide punishment, deter others
from engaging in the same behavior, and to protect others, while also enabling
the defendant to receive proper treatment for any medical, mental, or
substance abuse disorder. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Sentencing judges are also
required to impose a sentence that is "sufficient but not greater than
necessary" in order to satisfy those goals. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Therefore, in
formulating a "middle ground" theory, it may be helpful to implement a test
that applies several factors, a balancing test, or a sliding scale approach.
Under a multi-factor test, sentencing courts would consider certain
factors, such as the degree of diminished capacity due to the physical or
mental illness, the defendant's ability to function in everyday activities, the
extent of medical care required by the defendant in treating his or her illness,
the availability and quality of medication and/or treatment programs in the
BOP, and the current treatment and medication received by the defendant
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2. Addressing the Downfalls
One downfall in this proposed approach is that establishing a
new category for those defendants battling significant but not
extraordinary physical or mental illness will allow for greater
exercise of discretion on the part of judges. However, the courts
can build precedent, as they have done in the past, by establishing,
breaking down, and re-establishing effective rules in assessing the
medical needs of defendants until a workable and effective
approach is fashioned." 3
This creation of a new category may invoke a separation of
powers issue in which the judges may be viewed as infringing on
the powers vested in the BOP. The response to this downfall lies
in one of the very milestones of Booker's history - the Mistretta
case. " ' Mistretta explicitly provided the Judicial Branch with
discretion in sentencing and held that this discretion would not
undermine other duties vested in other branches of government.'15
Allowing judges to use their discretion to sentence a defendant to

outside of prison. Other factors to be considered would include the lowered life
expectancy of the defendant due to the physical or mental illness, or whether
the defendant is deteriorating because he or she is elderly. See Mary Price,
The Other Safety Valve: Sentence Reduction Motions under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A), 13 FED. SENT'G REP. 188, 191 (2001) (proposing similar factors
to be considered in deciding whether to reduce a defendant's time in prison
when he has already been sentenced and is currently serving time in prison).
Under the proposed balancing approach, judges would weigh the effects,
or injury, of incarcerating the physically/mentally ill defendant against the
sufficiency, or appropriateness, of sentencing the defendant to imprisonment.
Similarly, in a sliding scale approach, the decision of whether or not to impose
a prison sentence (as opposed to a non-prison sentence), and the length of a
sentence (if prison is chosen), would depend on, for example, the seriousness of
the defendant's medical condition and/or the extensiveness of the medical
treatment required to accommodate the defendant's health. In theory, the
more serious the defendant's ailments or mental illness (or the more extensive
the required treatment is), the more appropriate a non-prison sentence would
be. Note that under these approaches, the defendant is not limited to the allor-nothing "extraordinary impairment" requirement.
113. For example, suitable approach may be a five factor test where all five
factors must be addressed in relation to the defendant's physical or mental
health. A subsequent court may decide that one of those factors should not be
addressed, or that two additional factors should be incorporated into the test.
This, in and of itself, would create precedent for future courts to follow.
114. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380 (addressing the defendant's argument
that the Sentencing Reform Act and the creation of the Sentencing
Commission by Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine). The
Court found that granting legislative powers to the Sentencing Commission,
which was an "independent body" under the Judicial Branch, did not violate
the separation powers because the powers granted were not excessive. Id. at
412.
115. Id. at 385. The Mistretta court further reasoned that the theory of
separation of powers, which is so firmly rooted in our constitutional history, is
not contravened "by mere anomaly or innovation." Id.
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an alternative to imprisonment due to physical or mental health
concerns requires no more power than what is already afforded the
courts during sentencing. Thus, the only repercussion the BOP
would feel would be a decrease in the number of incoming inmates,
which would actually be an improvement to the overcrowding
problem.
3. Is the Ball in the Judges' Court?: Moving Away from Booker
Booker stands on shaky ground." 6 Several Circuit Courts
have chosen to adopt a presumption of reasonableness when the
sentence lies within the Guideline range."' Most recently, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases to determine two
specific issues relating directly to the Guidelines." 8 The first issue
considered by the Supreme Court was whether a sentence within
of
be granted a presumption
should
the Guidelines
reasonableness." 9 The second issue was whether a judge is
required to show "extraordinary circumstances" when sentencing a
defendant substantially below the range under the Guidelines. 2 °
In reviewing these issues, the Supreme Court found that a
presumption of reasonableness is given to sentences that are
However, this presumption
within the Guideline range. "'
consequently reverts the Guidelines back to a2 mandatory nature,
which was expressly prohibited under Booker.' '

116. See Hon. Tim Leonard, supra note 107, at 119 (predicting that the
Booker decision is the case most likely to be revisited by the Supreme Court).
Courts are still anticipating more guidance as to what exactly is meant by
"advisory" Guidelines. Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Revisit Federal
Sentencing Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2006, at 17.
117. United States v. Morris, 448 F.3d 929, 931-32 (6th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Wurzinger, No. 05-3803, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 26917, at *4 (7th Cir.
Oct. 30, 2006); United States v. Myers, 439 F.3d 415, 417 (8th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054 (10th Cir. 2006).
118. Greenhouse, supra note 117. These two highly anticipated cases were
United States v. Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007), and Claiborne v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 551 (2006). Sadly, Mr. Claiborne's case was later dismissed by the
Supreme Court, vacating the Eighth Circuit's judgment as moot, due to the
truly unfortunate death of the defendant, Mr. Mario Claiborne. Claiborne,
127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007). The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari in
United States v. Gall, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007), as a replacement for Claiborne.
119. Greenhouse, supra note 117, at A.1; Claiborne, 127 S. Ct. at 551.
120. Greenhouse, supra note 117, at A.1; Claiborne, 127 S. Ct. at 551.
121. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2459, 2465 (holding that this presumption only
applies to appellate review and emphasizing that district courts do not enjoy
this presumption when determining a sentence).
122. The Supreme Court recognized in its decision that this presumption
may very well "encourage sentencing judges to impose Guidelines sentences,"
but chose to ignore the constitutional implications this would inevitably cause.
Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2467. Clearly, this brings back the recurring issue of a
Sixth Amendment violation.
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The second issue was just recently decided by the Supreme
Court.
Previously, the Eighth Circuit held that "[an
extraordinary reduction [in sentence] must be supported by
extraordinary circumstances."" 3 However, the Supreme Court
reversed the Eighth Circuit, holding that "extraordinary"
circumstances are not required to justify a sentence outside the
Guideline range."' The Supreme Court further established that
while a sentence within the Guideline range may be treated as
presumptively reasonable, a sentence outside the Guideline range
is not to be treated as presumptively unreasonable. 2 '
Additionally, the Gall Court provided support to the argument
that probation may be an adequate form of punishment in many
cases. 12 The Gall decision clearly paves the way for judges who
wish to sentence outside the Guideline range but have been
hesitant in the wake of Booker. Judges should cling to the Gall
opinion in support of giving lower sentences to those mentally and
physically ill defendants whose punishment would be better
served through a non-prison sentence.
B. Proposalsfor Congress
First, Congress must reject any sentencing legislation that
would limit judges' discretion granted under Booker, such as the
"Sentencing Fairness and Equity Restoration Act of 2006"
proposed by Rep. Sensenbrenner."' This bill is aimed to strip
judges of their discretion under Booker for imposing below
Guidelines sentences, and would restore a mandatory-Guidelines
regime. Instead, Congress should adopt a system similar to the
Mentally Ill Offender Act.121 In doing so, Congress can alleviate

123. United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted,
127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007), rev'd, 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007). Just as the Eighth Circuit
stated in Claiborne's appellate opinion, the Gall court stated that a judge's
justification for imposing a below-Guideline range sentence must be stronger

the further the judge departs from the Guideline range. Id. In Gall's case, the
Eighth Circuit found his sentence by the district court of twenty-six months
probation unreasonable when his Guidelines range was thirty to thirty-seven
months imprisonment. Id. at 886, 887, 889.
124. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 595, 597 (2007). The Court
emphasized that the same standard of review on appeal - the deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard - applies to appellate review of any sentences,

whether within the Guideline range, above it, or below it. Id. at 596. The only
requirement of the district judge is that he provide an "adequate" explanation
for his decision to sentence outside the Guideline range. Id. at 597.
125. Id. at 595.
126. See id. at 593, 595-96 (discussing the substantial restraints on an
individual's liberty that are imposed by a sentence of probation).
127. See supra note 47 (discussing briefly the proposed legislation and its
downfalls).
128. See supra Part N.A. (discussing the introduction of the Mentally Ill

Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act implemented at the state level).
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the prisons of their assumed duty of acting as hospital or asylum
and focus more on diverting
for the physically and mentally ill,
2 9
defendants to treatment programs.
C. ProposedAmendments for the Sentencing Commission
The Sentencing Commission is required to publish updated
and amended Guidelines each year and to hold public hearings.'3
The Commission must, therefore, embrace the changes taking
place after Booker. It must realize the needs of individuals who
are dealing with medical problems and the toll on the growing
prison population to better account for these circumstances in the
The Commission can do so by incorporating
Guidelines.'31
mitigating provisions for those with physical or mental health
In reviewing and revising the Guidelines, the
problems.
Commission must also keep in mind the goals of sentencing, in
particular, the need to provide defendants with adequate medical
care in the "most effective way."132
Congress should aim to extend the act to those dealing with physical ailments,
as well.
129. Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-414, § 3(3), 118 Stat. 2328; see also An Examination of S. 1194, The
Mentally Ill Offender Treatment and Crime Reduction Act of 2003: Hearing on
S. 1194 Before the U.S. S. Comm. On the Judiciary, (2003) (testimony of J.
Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Chair, Sup. Ct. of Ohio Advisory Comm. On
Mentally Ill in the Courts) (praising the effects of the new legislation and
discussing the projects that have been implemented in Ohio). Congress should
look to the system adopted by the State of Ohio, which combines the efforts of
the courts, the police, and the community with other departments and
agencies who deal directly with the mentally ill and substance abusers. Id.
Ohio's system aims at educating prison and court employees about the
mentally ill, implementing a crisis intervention program for mentally ill in the
community, and improving prison conditions for the mentally ill. Id. To
reiterate, though, if Congress were to adopt legislation along these lines, it
must also incorporate provisions geared towards defendants suffering from a
physical impairment.
130. 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), (p), (x) (2000).
131. For example, the Sentencing Commission could provide a specific
guideline lowering the sentence range for those defendants who are "at risk,"
such as the elderly and/or those suffering from a chronic physical condition,
such as hypertension, diabetes, or arthritis. The Sentencing Commission
could also create a guideline geared toward mentally ill defendants, possibly
creating a scale in relation to how extraordinary or minor the impairment may
be based on the weight of the expert testimony and other evidence. The
Sentencing Commission could also explicitly create a provision advocating for
a non-prison sentence, such as home confinement or probation, when it is clear
that the defendant would have substantial problems in obtaining proper
medical care if sentenced to a term of imprisonment. This provision could also
apply if imprisonment would severely disrupt the medical treatment already
in place, and if it is shown that the BOP cannot provide an equally effective
and continuous alternative to that treatment.
132. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). The Guidelines Manual contains numerous
provisions that prohibit a defendant from receiving a lower sentence. For
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D. Recommendations for the BOP
In general, the focus must be shifted from the BOP to the
judges to remedy the problem plaguing our prisons. The BOP's
consistent claim that it can address all medical needs of inmates
has not proven true. " Frankly, the BOP simply does not have the
financial capacity to fully address all of the problems within its
medical system because of the overwhelming surge of defendants
pouring into prison facilities and the under-funded staff and
medical programs."'
Nevertheless, continuing attempts to address all medical
needs of all inmates can and must still be a goal for the BOP. In
general, the BOP must strive to achieve a higher standard of
mental health treatment and medical care for its prisoners,
improve the training and licensing of its medical staff, and
increase its staffing. However, the BOP will more likely find more
ways to shield the poor medical care provided behind its bars from
the public eye, and continue boasting its ability to treat all medical
conditions, as it has done in the past. 35' Therefore, the focus must
shift to the judges, who must require more than a generalized
assurance from the BOP that they would be able to treat a

example, the Guidelines Manual stipulates that sentencing courts generally
are not to take into account a defendant's mental or physical condition, nor
may they impose a non-prison sentence for defendant's falling into Zone D of
the Sentencing Table. GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 10, §§ 5H1.3, 5H1.4,
5C1.1(f). Now that the Guidelines are purely advisory, these provisions must
either be excised or more fully explained in order to rid its seemingly
mandatory nature and allow for more discretion to be exercised by the judge.
Even though these provisions are no longer mandatory, the language of the
provisions themselves may still hinder defense attorneys from making such
arguments and judges from sentencing outside the realm of those provisions.
The Sentencing Commission could add a commentary note explaining that
these provisions are no longer mandatory under Booker and need not be
adhered to in every case.
133. See supra Part III. (addressing the inadequacy of the BOP's medical
treatment for inmates).
134. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 51, at 49. What is worse is that the
poorly funded medical programs do not seem to account for the drastic
increase in cost to provide daily care to a physically or mentally ill inmate as
opposed to "the average inmate." See, e.g., id. (estimating that the "average
daily cost" to care for a mentally ill inmate in a state facility is $140, as
opposed to $80 for "the average inmate"); Ryan S. King & Marc Mauer, Aging
Behind Bars: "Three Strikes" Seven Years Later, SENT'G PROJECT 3, 12 (2001)
(reporting that the cost to care for an elderly inmate would total $1.5 million
for a twenty-five year sentence, whereas the average inmate would only total
$605,000 for a twenty-five year term). One can only assume that these figures
have continued to climb over the past five years, and will continue to do so in
the near future.
135. See supra note 97 (discussing examples of the BOP's efforts in enticing
sentencing judges to believe that the BOP will provide adequate health care to
the defendants being sentenced).
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particular defendant's physical or mental health problem.' 36 It
would be advantageous to allow both the defense counsel and the
prosecutor to research the types of treatment programs and
medical care available to a particular defendant after the BOP's
submission has been made.1 7
VI. CONCLUSION

How do we provide adequate healthcare and treatment to the
mentally and physically ill defendant while maintaining a fair
sentencing regime? Booker provides a solution to the problem.
Prisons must no longer be used as warehouses for the physically
and mentally infirm. The inadequacy of the BOP in treating
patients in prison must be recognized by the courts. Because the
new view set forth in Booker explicitly urges judges to see each
defendant as an "individual," defendants should be afforded the
same medical treatment as any other human being. Sentencing
courts must not be "prisoners" of the pre-Booker era. Judges must
realize the devastating effects a sentence of imprisonment has on a
physically or mentally ill defendant, and use the sentencing
discretion granted under Booker to provide effective medical
treatment for these individuals.

136. Courts should require that the BOP submit a detailed report on how it
intends to care for a defendant suffering from a physical or mental condition,
just as the courts required in Martin, 363 F.3d at 50; Derbes, 369 F.3d at 582;
and Gee, 226 F.3d at 902; see also supra Part IV.B (discussing several cases in
which the courts rejected a "boilerplate" letter from the BOP).
137. The BOP might provide what appears to be a detailed report of
numerous treatment programs available in prison, when in actuality, the
defendant may not qualify for any of those programs. For example, in
response to a judge's inquiry as to whether the BOP will be able to adequately
treat a defendant suffering from a mental illness, the government might
submit a letter from the BOP listing several treatment programs that are
offered throughout the BOP facilities. At first glance, this may seem more
than adequate in order to provide medical treatment in the "most effective
manner." But after much research, defense counsel may discover that six out
of eight of the programs only apply to males, and the remaining treatment
programs are only available at high-security facilities. Thus, if the defendant
would most likely be sentenced to a minimum security facility, and is female,
it is most probable that she would not receive adequate medical care. Defense
counsel should be aware of these types of assurances from the BOP and must
research the programs to determine if they are truly available to each
particular defendant.

